This paper examines the impact of payment choice on charitable giving with a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment. Respondents can donate cash only, use debit only, or have both options. Cash donations have lower visibility vis-á-vis solicitors than debit card donations. When debit replaces cash, participation drops by 87 percent (p < 0.001). Conditional on participation, donors in the Debit-only treatment give more than donors in Cash-only (p = 0.017). This suggests that people's giving is partly image-motivated. When both cash and debit can be used, almost all donors prefer cash; participation decreases compared to the Cash-only treatment (p = 0.049). 
Introduction
Consumers have increasingly shifted from conventional payment instruments like cash and checks to plastic payment instruments like credit cards and debit cards in point of sale (POS) transactions. In the US, annual debit card transactions now exceed credit card transactions (Borzekowski, Kiser and Ahmed, 2008) . In the Netherlands, debit card use is very common, with the average household owning about 2.8 debit cards. Despite these shifts in consumer payment behavior, the literature on the economics of charity has not yet addressed the question how payment options affect charitable giving.
1 Whereas in retail settings the value of the transaction is known to both seller and buyer, donors in a charity context can influence the visibility of the amount given in their choice of a particular payment instrument. Therefore, and dependent on the extent to which individuals care about how they are perceived by others, the menu of payment options offered by the charity is likely to affect the number of households that participate in the fund-raising drive (extensive margin) and the level of individual contributions of participating households (intensive margin). Visibility however is only one product dimension in which the cash and debit experiment differ. Other relevant product dimensions include time-cost (a preference for speed), convenience (the weight of cash), restraint (a desire to limit overspending), security (the risk of debit card fraud) and the salience of the instrument (cash is more salient in physical form than debit). Each of these variables may induce a preference for either cash or debit.
2 cal and personal characteristics of solicitors to see their effect on the amounts contributed to the charity. This replication exercise is useful because randomization is at the solicitor level, and the number of solicitors employed per treatment is modest in this and similar door-to-door fund-raising experiments. Consistent with Landry et al. (2006) , I find that the solicitor self-efficacy has a positive effect on the amount given whereas solicitor selfconfidence has a negative impact (p < 0.05). The estimates show that female solicitors induce higher participation rates, but do not indicate a relation with the physical attractiveness of the solicitor.
Motivated by these findings, I extend the Bénabou and Tirole's (2006) theoretical model on prosocial behavior to situations where participation and the visibility of the donation are choice variables. Individuals engage in prosocial acts like giving to charity because there are intrinsically motivated (they care for other's well-being), extrinsically motivated (there is a material reward or benefit associated with giving) and/or image-motivated (they care about how they are perceived by others). Bénabou and Tirole (2006) show that individuals donate more when their contribution is revealed. Their model predicts that the more important image concerns, the higher this excess donation. The modified model shows that when people can choose whether or not to participate and to reveal, they prefer to opt-in and reveal, as long as this is not too costly in terms of the excess donation needed.
In a direct test of the Bénabou and Tirole model, Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) have identified that, both in the laboratory and in the field, image motivation interacts with extrinsic motives. 4 The empirical analysis in this 4 A number of laboratory and field experimental studies have been published on reputational concerns in giving to charity. Grossman (2009) presents evidence that in experimental dictator games, social signaling and not self-signaling is what induces dictators to give. A number of other studies have also found a positive effect of visibility on prosocial behavior (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Soetevent, 2005; Alpizar, paper aims to identify whether any observed differences in donation decisions between the three treatments are driven by image motivation or that these differences should be attributed to any of the other characteristics in which the cash and debit instrument differ. The key identifying characteristic used in this paper is that image-motivation, if present, induces people to donate more when their contribution is revealed, whereas other payment drivers only impose a preference for using either cash or debit.
Image Motivation
This section develops a modified version of the Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model on prosocial behavior. I extend this model to incorporate situations where agents are free to participate or not and can choose to reveal the amount given. The model provides qualitative and testable hypotheses about the impact of payment options on prosocial behavior and the interaction between payment choice and image motivation. These hypotheses will frame the subsequent empirical analysis. An agent's utility is specified by the additive quadratic utility function U (a, m; M ) = va + R(a, m; M ) − C(a),
with a ∈ R + the amount given, m ∈ M the payment instrument used and M the set of available payment instruments; M = {c}, {d}, {c, d} in the Cashonly, Debit-only, and Cash&Debit treatment, respectively; c indicates a cash donation and d a debit card donation. An individual's incentives to behave prosocially consist of two components. Besides an intrinsic motivation to donate a certain amount (v), agents are susceptible to image motivation Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008) .
(R(a, m; M )). 5 The direct benefit of participation at level a is va and C(a) the associated cost. I assume v ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ) distributed with µ > 0 and the cost function taking the form
with I(·) indicator functions. The parameter φ ≥ 0 reflects the effort, say, time cost associated with making a donation; δ absorbs the difference in utility between cash and debit donations. When donors do not like debit, δ > 0. The reputational payoff function R(a, m; M ) is defined as:
In contrast to Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , agents can choose the visibility of the amount given by the choice of a payment instrument m. When the respondent uses her debit card, the exact amount given is visible to the solicitor; when cash is used, the solicitor observes that a donation is made but not its value. For this reason, the reputational payoff of donating cash is independent of the amount given, i.e. R(a, c; M ) = R(c; M ). Agents maximize (1) by choosing the optimal donation a and payment instrument m, conditional on the set of available payment instruments M .
The behavioral implications of this model for the three experimental treatments M = {c}, {d}, {c, d} are as follows. First consider the optimal 5 The component in the Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model that represents extrinsic motivation is not included because extrinsic or monetary rewards are absent in the current experimental design. Debit users may receive a tax deduction when they keep their receipt and when their total donations to charity in a given year exceed 1% of gross income. The vast majority of households does however not meet this threshold and moreover, solicitors do not observe who is eligible for a deduction. For these reasons, this possibility is ignored. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of tax deductions on charitable giving is mixed (Andreoni, 2008; Fack and Landais, 2007) .
individual supply of prosocial activity a * for agents with v > 0, conditional on available and chosen payment instruments M and m. Given identical image concerns γ for all agents, Bénabou and Tirole (2006, p. 1661) show that in equilibrium, participating individuals donate at the level:
with r(m, M ) = ∂R(a, m; M )/∂a denoting the (constant) marginal image motivation, which is independent of a. In the case of cash donations, agents have no incentive to donate more than their intrinsic value v because the exact amount given is unobserved. When individual donations are revealed and image motivation positively affects prosocial behavior (γ > 0), an agent's optimal donation equals her intrinsic motivation plus an excess donation γ.
7
Prior to making a decision on which amount to give, agents have to decide whether or not to participate in the fund raise, and, when they choose to participate, which payment instrument to use. This in contrast to the experiments by Ariely et al. (2009) , where subjects sign up for the experiment and subsequently learn the treatment. An agent's utility of non-participation in treatment M is
In any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, if agents of typev (do not) participate, all agents with v >v (v <v) will also (not) participate. 8 Using (5) and inserting (3), and (4) in (1), one finds that all agents with v > 7 The experimental design in this paper rules out the possibility that γ < 0 because of the absence of extrinsic or monetary rewards.√ 2φ (v > γ 2 + 2(φ + δ)) strictly prefer to give cash (debit) over nonparticipation.
Cash-only treatment (M = {c}) In the Cash-only treatment, agents with v > √ 2φ will participate and contribute exactly v. Reputational payoffs of donating cash and non-participation equal
respectively. Solving U ( , c; {c}) = U (0; {c}) for v shows that the agent with
is indifferent between not participating and donating a small amount of cash. Therefore, agents with v
participate and donate a minimal amount motivated by image concerns. In donating a small amount, they signal to the solicitor that they are 'good'. I refer to these participants as 'marginal donors'.
9
If the effort associated with making a donation is zero or small compared to image concerns (φ << γ), lim ↓0 v {c} 0 = −∞ and we will observe full participation with all agents making at least a minimal contribution. The intuition is that the normality of v and the relatively fat tails of the normal distribution allow the intrinsic motivation to take extreme values. 
11
Debit-only treatment (M = {d}) In the Debit-only treatment, agents with intrinsic valuation v < −γ will not participate in equilibrium because
for v shows that the agent with v {d} 0 equal to
is indifferent between not participating and making a debit card transac-
Note that, because of the upper bound in equation (7), agents with a high enough intrinsic motivation will prefer to use the debit terminal over non-participation. However, note as well that the upper bound is increasing in φ, δ, and in γ (for µ > 0). It may therefore happen that none of these donors is solicited when either the time-cost of donating is large, the experienced disutility of donating by debit instead of cash is large, or when image concerns receive high weight, respectively.
The reputational incentive thus has two offsetting effects on participation.
have one or two solutions for a given θ. For large θ, the only solution is v (6) down to −∞ unless either γ is very small and/or in the denominator is large enough. Bénabou and Tirole (2006, p. 1660 fn. 18 ) likewise mention that often, ". . . normality yields great tractability at the cost of allowing certain variables to take implausible negative values."
11 In practice, an agent's value of depends on his particular wallet content at the moment of solicitation. Data used by Franses and Kippers (2007) reveal that about 70 percent of Dutch consumers have at least one coin with a value of e0.20 or less in their wallet. This suggests that wallet contents do not limit the observed number of marginal donors.
12 The upper bound on v 
9
On the one hand, higher values of γ give agents larger incentives to donate in order to separate themselves from non-participants. On the other hand, the higher γ, the higher a * (d; {d}) and with that the cost of participation. Under normality of v, the separation motive is the dominant force, for small values of γ. For γ large, more and more agents opt-out because the cost of donating exceeds the benefits of separating from the group of non-participants.
Cash&Debit-treatment (M = {c, d}) In the Cash&Debit treatment, agents have to decide both on participation and on the use of a payment instrument. For agents with v > 0, the utility of donating cash is
and the utility of donating debit is
In equation (8) 
and v {c,d}
The second expression follows from equating (9) and (8) and solving for v.
When γ = 0, the preference for cash or debit donations is solely dependent on δ: all donors use cash (debit) if δ > 0 (δ < 0). As in the cash-only case, either none or all agents with v < √ 2φ will be marginal donors in equilibrium for sufficiently small. Note that v {c,d} C|D in equation (11) increases with γ: when the excess donation is small (low γ), all solicited agents may choose to reveal and donate by debit card; but when this excess donation is high, most agents may prefer to donate cash. Table 1 gives numerical evaluations for some model specifications (µ = 1.24 and σ = 1.37 correspond to the empirically observed mean and standard deviation of donations in the Cash-only treatment). In sum, we have the following research hypotheses about the relation between payment choice, reputational concerns and contributions to charity:
1. DISTASTE FOR DEBIT If γ = 0 and agents dislike using debit (cash), i.e. δ > 0 (δ < 0), they will use cash (debit) in the Cash&Debit treatment.
If γ > 0 and δ = 0, many agents will use debit in the Cash&Debit treatment as long as γ is moderate. If γ > 0 and δ > 0, the use of cash and
13 Matlab code to perform these calculations is available from the author upon request. Table 1 : Numerical evaluation of the theoretical model for specific parameter values; v ∼ N (µ, σ) with µ = 1.24 and σ = 1.37.
( : intrinsic motivation of the agent indifferent between participating and not participating in the Cash-only, Cash&Debit and Debit-only treatment, resp. v {c,d} C|D : intrinsic motivation of the agent indifferent between a cash and debit donation in the Cash&Debit treatment.
debit depends on the relative size of γ and δ; if δ γ, only agents with high intrinsic motivation will use debit.
2. IMAGE MOTIVATION If γ > 0, contributing agents will make an excess donation when their donation is revealed. In the Cash&Debit treatment, the debit instrument will be first used by donors with high intrinsic motivation; agents will low intrinsic motivation will prefer to donate cash.
If γ = 0, donors will not make excess donations when revealed, and the choice for cash or debit is unrelated to an agent's intrinsic motivation.
PRESENCE OF MARGINAL DONORS When image concerns γ
are important compared to the time cost of donating φ, agents who would not participate otherwise will donate a marginal amount in the treatments with cash, implying full participation. These marginal donors will not participate if either γ = 0 or φ is large compared to γ.
Experimental Design
This experiment has been performed in collaboration with the Reumafonds, the Dutch rheumatism fund. This fund supports people with rheumatic diseases and finances research on rheumatism. The fund is widely known and is one of the largest charities in the Netherlands in terms of income out of door-to-door fund-raising. In 2006, the fund-raising drive brought in e3.2 million, on a total income of e16.1 million.
14 Other partners were CCV, which supplied the solicitors with mobile debit terminals, and KPN, a major Dutch telecommunications firm which supplied the data transmission technology necessary to record the individual debit card transactions.
Door-to-door fund-raising campaigns in the Netherlands are coordinated by the Central Bureau on Fund-raising (CBF). This bureau assigns each charity a particular week to organize a nation-wide fund-raising drive. This ensures that households are never approached by more than one charity a week and that charities can publicize their fund-raising drive on national television and in newspapers. Solicitors in the treatments that included cash, received a sealed collection box and two small packages of envelopes which carried the official logo of the charity. 16 The envelopes were numbered on the inside to track the token composition of each donation and to link donations afterwards to the solicitee's background characteristics. Households were asked to put their donation in the envelope and to put the filled envelope into the box.
Solicitors in the treatments that included the debit terminal participated in a training session in which an instructor from CCV explained how to use the debit terminals. After a plenary instruction, students practiced by sliding through their own debit cards and making donations of one eurocent. In the end, everyone understood how to operate the terminal. Similar to the collection boxes, the debit card terminals carried the name of the Reumafonds. Transaction summaries were printed when a terminal was returned.
In this way individual debit card donations could be linked to the background characteristics of the contributors. Donors who used the terminal received a printed receipt from the solicitor as proof of their payment. Neither the donor nor the charity had to pay a fee for using the debit terminal and the donation was immediately debited from the donor's deposit account.
Care was taken that this framed field experiment resembled ordinary door-to-door fund-raising drives as closely as the nature of our setup allowed.
For example, the student-solicitors used the same type of collection boxes as the other solicitors of the fund, they carried a bag and portfolio with the official logo of the fund and the informational brochures and the balloons they could give to small children at the door were identical to the ones used by other solicitors of the fund.
Solicitors were recruited by e-mail among students of the University of Amsterdam and were paid e75 after the data collection had been completed. ality trait. The difference is particularly large for performance motivation.
These differences might reflect real cross-cultural differences in personality traits between US students and Dutch students, but may also result from cross-cultural differences in answering this type of questions. In the week before the actual fund-raising drive, three separate training sessions were organized, one for each treatment group in order to prevent cross-contamination and information exchange across treatments. These ses-sions lasted 40 to 50 minutes. Each session was led by the same researcher, the same spokesperson of Reumafonds and the same instructor from CCV.
In the first part of the training, the setup of the project was explained and solicitors were supplied with materials. In the second part, the spokesperson of the Reumafonds provided the solicitors with background information on the fund and reviewed the fund's mission statement. Explicit attention was given to the way volunteers of the fund tend to approach people to solicit donations. In case small children opened the door, solicitors were advised to ask for one of their parents.
Like ordinary volunteers of the Reumafonds, our solicitors were free to choose which day(s) in the week March 10-15 they went out soliciting contributions, as long as they went out between 4-8.30 p.m., when most people are at home. In total solicitors had to work for about four hours; most chose to solicit one day, but some split work in two days of about two hours each.
A short summary of the experimental design is presented in 18 This amounts to e83, e75 and e27, respectively, per solicitor. For comparison, the average amount raised by a Reumafonds solicitor is about e55. In our case, average revenues are higher because our solicitors were supplied with about 120 addresses in order to obtain sufficient observations. Normal routes contain about 80 addresses.
Descriptive statistics
19 Unless stated otherwise, the reported p-values in this section are based on Mann Whitney rank sum tests. Average donations are independent across treatments, but dependent within treatments because a given solicitor approaches a number of households. I follow Landry et al. (2006) in using a conservative test at the solicitor level by calculating for each solicitor the average donation and then rank solicitors on basis of these averages. The bottom panel of Table 4 provides summary statistics per treatment on the age and gender composition of households that answered the door.
The table also gives the percentage of (fe)males that contributes, the percentage of (fe)males that donates cash or debit for each treatment, and the average estimated age of contributing respondents. This in itself is of interest, but also serves as a check whether the routes are similar across treatments.
20
A regression of the age and gender of households members on treatment dummies does not reveal differences in gender distribution across treatments but individuals in the Debit-only treatment are somewhat younger than those in the two other treatments. This difference is significant but of similar magnitude as the difference in age across treatments reported by Landry et al.
(2006). Empirical studies have identified a negative correlation between age
and the use of electronic payment instruments (Stavins, 2001; Jonker, 2007) . This implies that the observed difference in age distribution might bias participation rates in the Debit-only treatment slightly upward. Table 4 shows that introduction of the debit terminal next to the box reduces participation from 66.9 to 59.0 percent (p = 0.049). Although the difference is on the border of being significant, it is remarkable that extending the set of payment options does not help to increase participation. This is in contrast to simple neoclassical theories of consumer demand. One explanation is that respondents distrust solicitors with a debit terminal, even when the cash instrument is also available. An alternative explanation is that larger menus trigger decision-making paralysis. First, a security issue surrounding debit card use is the risk of fraud (Jonker, 2007, p. 295) . Indeed a number of respondents said they were turned- off by the presence of the debit-terminal for reasons of security. give respondents a preference for donations by debit and cash, respectively.
Participation and payment choice

23
The data clearly show that the net effect on participation of replacing cash 22 Solicitors did not systematically collect information on this but they sometimes wrote down that a solicitee did not trust using the terminal. In the Cash&Debit treatment two such remarks were recorded against nine in the Debit-only treatment.
23 Information on individual wallet contents is not available in this experiment. Given that the experiment takes place at the beginning of the month when most people have just received their paychecks, it is likely that most households approached have a positive balance at their debit card account.
by debit is negative.
Image motivation
The hypothesis on image motivation makes two predictions. First, if reputational concerns matter, donating households will make an excess donation when their donation is revealed. Second, in the treatment with both cash and debit, donors will separate and the donors with the highest intrinsic motivation will choose debit. The data do not shed much light on the second effect because only three respondents use debit in the Cash&Debit treatment.
Although their gifts are (e2, e2.50 and e5) are above average, they are by no means exceptional: 186 cash donors in this treatment donate e2 or more and 12 of them give more than e5. An alternative, but untestable explanation for the debit card use of these three particular donors is that they were not motivated by image concerns but by cash-on-hand constraints. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on the first effect of excess donations by comparing behavior in the Cash-only and Debit-only treatment Table 4 shows that conditional on contributing, donors in the Cash&Debit and Debit-only treatment donate e4.16, which is 125% more than those in the Cash-only treatment (p = 0.017). Additional information on the distribution of the amount given across the different treatments, displayed in Figure 3, shows this even more clearly. The most important finding illustrated by Figure 3 is the substantial decrease in gifts smaller than e5 in the Debit-only treatment compared to the Cash-only treatment on the one hand. Donations between e0.01-e0.99, e1.00-e1.99 and e2.00-e4.99 drop by 12.8, 21.7 and 24.8 percentage points, respectively, and all these differences are significant at the 0.1%-level.
24 On the other hand, the same replacement somewhat increases (0.5 percentage points) the incidence of large donations, though not significantly.
Since each household participates in one treatment only, we do not observe the counterfactual. That is, for households in the Cash-only treatment, we do not observe the amount they would have given in the Debit-only treatment and vice versa. As a consequence, the evidence does not tell to which extent the relatively high incidence of large donations in the Debit-only treatment is due to self-selection (only households with high intrinsic motivation continue to participate when only debit donations are possible) or due to excess donations (households donate more than their intrinsic motivation because their contribution is visible): the models in columns (3) and (5) Table 5 . I use the estimated coefficients on age and gender to calculate for each respondent in the Cash-only and the Debit-only treatment the propensity score: the predicted probability that a respondent will donate given the respondent's background characteristics. This propensity score can be interpreted as a proxy for a respondent's intrinsic motivation to donate, insofar this motivation is correlated with age and gender. two observations. First, in accordance with the distaste-for-debit hypothesis, few respondents with a low propensity score (< 0.65) "continue" to donate in the Debit-only treatment whereas more respondents with a stronger feel toward the charity are more likely to continue donating via debit when that is the only option. Second, I construct a matching estimator that effectively compares donation decisions by households in the Debit-only treatment to those by households in the Cash-only treatment with similar observable characteristics. 25 Each household in the Debit-only treatment is matched with the four closest households in the Cash-only treatment and vice versa, where closeness is measured in terms of the distance between estimated propensity scores. The average effect on participating households of replacing cash by the debit instrument is calculated by comparing for each household the average donation a i with the average donationâ i made by the matched house-25 This method dates back to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) .
with N the total number of positive donations in the Cash-only and Debitonly treatments. 26 The average effect is estimated to be e2.28 (p < 0.001), this is the amount participating households in the Debit-only treatment give more compared to participating households with similar characteristics in the Cash-only treatment.
Explanations other than image concerns are however possible to explain the observed excess donations. Donors may feel less restraint to make larger donations when they use their debit card because they do not physically observe the amount they transfer. It is also possible that despite the abolishment of surcharges, people still associate use of debit with larger amounts. 
Marginal donors
When we consider the presence of marginal donors, Table 4 does not show full participation in the treatments with cash: about 35 to 40 percent of the contacts does not participate. This is consistent with a situation where image concerns are absent or small compared to the time-cost of donating.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at the proportion of cash donors who give small amounts. From Figure 3 we already know that in the treatments with cash, relatively more donors donate less than e5. Moreover, households with a low intrinsic valuation may seize the opportunity to rid themselves of loose change in their wallet: given that one feels obliged to participate in 26 I implemented this procedure using the psmatch2-module developed for STATA by Leuven and Sianesi (2009) . Robust analytical standard errors are computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006) . 27 Until recently, many merchants in the Netherlands used to charge a small fee (e0.10-e0.20) for payments below e10 (Brits and Winder, 2005) .
order to look good, the optimal small donation may be one that also empties one's wallet of bulky small change that is perceived worthless. Note: This figure excludes the share of households donating e0 and the figure does not display households donating over e10: in the Cash-only treatment no such donations were received, 3 in the Cash&Debit treatment (1xe15, 2xe20) and 2 in the Debit-only treatment (1xe15 and 1xe35).
To investigate whether coin disposal is an important consideration, I consider the efficiency of individual donations. Following Cramer (1983) and Kippers et al. (2003) , I call donations efficient if, conditional on the amount given, the number of tokens involved in the transaction is minimized. For example, a donation of e0.50 is efficient if one coin of 50 eurocent is used, but inefficient if two coins of 20 eurocent plus one of 10 eurocent are used.
Households that participate and simultaneously try to rid themselves of small change are likely to make inefficient donations. 28 Bunching is even more prominent in the Debit-only treatment. This is remarkable because debit card transactions do not involve the transaction of physical tokens and the set of euro coins and notes therefore does not impose any constraints on the value of the contribution. Nevertheless, the majority of debit donations has a value of 1, 2, 5 or 10 euro. This supports the hypothesis that some donors prefer inefficient cash payments: they drop out when the cash option is not offered. 
The role of individual characteristics
The small cell sizes (10 to 11 solicitors per treatment) and the potentially unbalanced composition across treatments in terms of solicitor and solicitee characteristics entails that one has to control for a number of covariates that potentially affect both participation and household contribution levels. In this section, I closely follow Landry et al. (2006) and estimate a series of linear regression models that explicitly control for observable and unobservable differences across solicitors and neighborhoods.
In giving to charity, households make two separate but closely related decisions; the decision whether or not to participate and the decision which amount to give. First, I estimate a linear regression model of the amount contributed by each respondent (including zero contributions) on treatment dummies and a number of other covariates:
In this equation, L ij is the contribution of household j to solicitor i and further contains a vector of treatment dummies Z and a vector X containing observable solicitor and solicitee characteristics and day-dummies to account for temporal heterogeneity in giving rates, e.g. due to changing weather conditions. The errors are clustered at the solicitor level to account for unobservable heterogeneity across solicitors. I assume that the errors are normally distributed. Table 6 presents estimates for different specifications of this model. Second, to increase our understanding of why households decide to participate in the fund raise, I introduce a latent variable C * ij , which is related as follows to the observed participation decision C ij : Table 7 .
In column 1 of Tables 6 and 7 , only the treatment dummies and a constant are included. The estimates confirm the findings in previous sections:
households contribute e0.86 less in the Debit-only treatment than in the Cash-only treatment and households are about 57 percent less likely to contribute if they were approached by a solicitor equipped with a debit terminal only. All these differences are significant at the p < 0.01 level. The possibility to pay by debit terminal next to the option of paying cash has a negative but insignificant impact on both participation and contributions.
The specification in columns 2 and 3 of both tables add day fixed effects and extend the model with solicitor's physical and personal characteristics like their beauty, assertiveness, self-confidence, BMI etc. Column 3 also includes information about the solicitee's gender and age. The age variable is interacted with treatment dummies because of empirical evidence that the probability of debit card use is higher among younger people. Consistent with this finding, the estimates in Table 7 show that in the Debit-only treatment, participation is relatively higher among respondents younger than 30 (p < 0.10). In line with most empirical evidence (see Bekkers and Wiepking, 2007) , none of the estimates indicates a significant difference between the donations of male and female solicitees. Column 4 also adds neighborhood specific fixed effects to control for unobserved differences between neighborhoods, like e.g.
household's income. 30 The neighborhood dummies are jointly significant and therefore included in the remaining regressions.
Before discussing the results on personality traits and physical attrac- Table 6 shows that solicitor self-efficacy has a positive, and in most specifications significant impact on average household contributions. A one unit increase in solicitor self-efficacy in the model presented in the third column generates an approximate e0.14 increase in average contribution levels. The estimate is well congruent with Landry et al. (2006) who arrive at a point 30 The municipality of Amsterdam identifies five different neigbhorhoods in the area selected for this field experiment. With on average 800 homes, these neighborhoods seem sufficiently small to be somewhat confident that within neighborhood, solicitee characteristics are fairly homogenous. I dropped observations that could not be linked with certainty to a specific neighborhood. This slightly reduces the sample size.
estimate of $0.18. Their evidence indicates that much of this increase comes from the positive impact on average participation rate, with a one-unit increase in self-efficacy generating an approximate 2 percent increase in the average probability of eliciting a contribution. The point estimates reported in Table 7 are of the same order of magnitude, but are not significant.
Overconfident solicitors seem to "turn off" solicitees: Tables 6 and 7 indicate that a one unit increase in solicitor self-confidence generates an approximate e0.08 decrease in average contribution levels (the 95% confidence interval runs from -0.16 to -0.03), mainly through an approximate 2 percent decrease in average probability of eliciting a contribution. The sign and magnitude of these effects is similar to Landry et al. (2006) , who report a $0.11 and 1 percent decrease, respectively. Similarly, Table 7 shows that solicitor assertiveness has a negative but insignificant impact on participation.
Landry et al. find a similar but significant impact of solicitor assertiveness.
Performance motivation has a positive impact on the probability of soliciting a contribution but this effect is only significant (p < 0.05) in specifications with neighborhood controls. Different from Landry et al. (2006) , this effect does not translate into higher average household contributions.
The results with regard to solicitor attractiveness are strikingly different from those obtained by Landry et al. (2006) . Whereas they find that only female physical attractiveness is correlated with higher contributions, estimates in column 4 of Table 7 instead show a significant effect of attractiveness on participation rates for male solicitors only. The effects of attractiveness however disappear as soon as interaction terms between the gender of the solicitor and the solicitee are included as is the case in column 7 of Table 7 .
31 It turns 31 The models whose estimates are reported in columns 6 and 7 of Tables 6 and 7 exactly match models D and E in Landry et al. (2006) , except for the age/payment-instrument interaction dummies.
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out that, irrespective of the gender of the solicitee, female solicitors are more effective in eliciting a contribution: male and female household members are both about 26 percent more likely to participate if they are approached by a female solicitor. Finally, Table 7 suggests that overweight solicitors are more successful in soliciting a donation, but since only two solicitors have a BMI that exceeds 25, this result should not be overinterpreted.
Conclusions
In the context of a door-to-door fund-raising experiment, this study has in- 
